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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did City officers Roper and Peterson subject Appellant

to a pretext stop?
2.

Was adequate evidence presented at trial to support a

finding by the jury that Appellant was in actual physical control
of his vehicle?
3.

Was Appellant was denied his constitutional protection

against being compelled to give evidence against himself when the
officer requested he perform certain field sobriety tests before
reading him the Miranda rights?
4.

Did adequate justifications exist to arrest Appellant for

both offenses charged?
5.

Does Appellant have standing to challenge the accuracy

and reliability of the intoxilyzer machine.
6.

Are the trial court's proceedings below void because the

assistant city attorney who prosecuted Appellant allegedly failed
to file an oath of office?
7.
Attorney,

Was it error for the trial court to allow Assistant City
Jeffery

"R"

Burbank,

to

prosecute

Appellant

when

Appellant had filed lawsuits against him?
8.

Was there sufficient evidence admitted in the trial below

to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or other drug to a degree that rendered Appellant incapable of
safely operating his vehicle?
9.

Has Appellant failed to meet his burden to show the trial
2

court committed errors in its factual findings?
10.

Was Appellant denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial

based on ineffectiveness of counsel?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol and/or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, and having
an open container in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor.
A jury trial was held in this matter on the 26th day of April,
1989 in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of
Cache, Logan Department, The Honorable Pamela Heffernan presiding.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.

The

court entered a judgment of the same on the 9th day of June, 1989.
Appellant is appealing from that verdict and judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts, as set forth in his brief, is
predominated with statements that were not presented at the trial
held in this matter and find no support in the transcript.
Appellant's statements are accompanied by citations.
statements

that

do

have

citations

apparently

refer

Few of

Those fact
to

separate documents listed by Appellant as "DLH,H "SH" and

three
M

TR."

Appellant's statements that are accompanied by a citation to the
trail transcript (TR) generally find no support in the citation but
are antithetical to it.
The vast majority of the statements Appellant offers as facts
are actually nothing more than legal conclusions or argument.
3

Appellant decided to not testify in the trial below but is
apparently attempting to do so through his brief.
Appellee objects to and disagrees with Appellant's statement
of the facts, finds them wholly without support and provides the
following facts offered as evidence in the proceedings below:
1.

Appellee, City of Logan, called four witnesses, all of

the city police department, to testify during their case-in-chief.
2.

Officer Roper testified that he and Officer Peterson were

on patrol in the City on February 11 1989. At approximately 2:00
am he observed two vehicles parked in the roadway just west of Main
Street on 200 South Street.

(All citations below refer to page

numbers in the transcript of the trail held in this matter, p. 2930)
3.

Roper walked up to one of the two vehicles, a pickup

truck, and made the following observations: Appellant, Don Dunbar,
the single occupant of the vehicle, was sitting in the driver's
position behind the steering wheel; the keys to the truck were in
the ignition, the engine was running and Appellant's left foot was
depressed on the clutch pedal; an open beer can was positioned on
the seat to the right of Appellant; and an odor of an alcoholic
beverage emitted from inside the vehicle.

(p.32-33)

Roper later

observed that the aforementioned beer can was partly full of beer,
(p.49-50)
4.

Roper asked Appellant to exit the vehicle.

turned the ignition off and exited the vehicle.
5.

Appellant

(p.33)

Roper smelled an alcoholic beverage on Appellant's breath
4

and asked him if he had been drinking.
he had had "two mini-bottles."

(p.34)

Appellant responded that
Roper noted Appellant's

face was extremely red and very flushed.
6.

(p. 43)

Roper had Appellant preform several field sobriety tests,

(p. 33-41)

At the conclusion of the tests, Roper testified that

based on his training and experience he was of the opinion that
Appellant was "under the influence of an alcoholic beverage to the
point where he was impaired and was not in a condition to safely
operate a vehicle."

At that time Roper placed Appellant under

arrest, recited the "Miranda rights" to him and requested that he
submit to a breath test.
7.

(p. 42-43, 45)

Roper transported Appellant to the jail, advised him of

the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test and read
admonitions to him from a DUI report form.

(p.43-44, 64-67)

8.

Appellant refused to submit to a breath test.

9.

Roper gave Appellant his Miranda rights again and asked

him if he understood them.
agreed to an interview.
10.

(p.44)

Appellant responded that he did and

(p.45)

During the interview, Appellant made several statements

including: that he had been operating a vehicle (p.45-46); that he
had been drinking, specifically "two mini-bottles and a mixed
drink" (p.48); and when asked if he was "under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage now" Appellant responded hesitantly and in
slurred speech with the words "not significantly."
11.

(p.49)

Appellee's second witness, Officer Peterson, testified

that he also saw the two vehicles parked in the road right next to
5

each other, with a distance of three feet between each other,
(p.70-71)
12.

Peterson observed Appellant sitting in the driver's

position inside his truck when they arrived on the scene.
13.

(p.72)

Peterson did not observe Appellant's performance of the

field sobriety tests because he was talking with the driver of the
other vehicle at the time Roper administered the tests, (p.72)
14. Peterson testified that he concluded Appellant was under
the influence of alcohol to a degree that he was unable to operate
a motor vehicle safely because of the following observations:
Appellant had "a strong odor of alcohol coming from him . . . his
face was extremely flushed, his eyes were very red . . . his speech
was deliberate, and running words together and continuing to repeat
words."

He also noticed that Appellant was having problems with

his balance inside the jail.
15.

(p.73)

Appellee's third witness, Officer Fillmore, testified

that he impounded and conducted an inventory of Appellant's vehicle
on the night in question.
16.

(p.80, 82)

Fillmore testified that when he arrived at the scene he

observed Appellant's vehicle parked in the travel portion of the
roadway.

Upon

searching

the vehicle

he discovered

several

containers of alcohol in the passenger compartment of Appellant's
vehicle incLuding an open beer can on the fount seat next to where
the driver would sit.

The can was three-forth full of beer,

(p.80-82)
17.

Appellee's forth and final witness, Officer Ken Kramer,
6

Evidence Custodial, testified for purposes of chain of custody with
respect to the several containers of alcohol, including the open
beer can, that were admitted into evidence.

(p. 83-84)

After

which, Appellee rested.
18.

Appellant did not testify himself but did call two

witnesses for his defense.
19.

Appellant's

first witness was

Clyde

Baugh.

Baugh

testified that he was the driver of the second vehicle the officers
observed early in the morning of February 11, 1991.
20.

(p-89)

Baugh testified he was driving his vehicle, a van, on

Second South at 1:30 am when he saw Appellant's vehicle parked
along the side of the road.

Baugh stopped his vehicle apparently

to engage in conversation with Appellant.
21.

(p.90)

Baugh described the scene as follows: the two vehicles

were parked on opposite sides of the road pointed in opposite
directions; Baugh had his window down; Appellant had his door open
(because the window would not open); Appellant was sitting sideways
in the seat facing out the door; and the two were talking.

(p.9 2-

93, 107-08)
22.

With respect to the vehicles' position on the roadway,

Baugh admitted that "we were probably obstructing something . . . "
but indicated that passing cars were able to get by them.

(p.97-

98, 101)
23.

Baugh indicated that during the ten to fifteen minutes

while they were conversing he did not see Appellant drink any
alcohol.

(p.98, 104)
7

24.

Baugh testified that his vehicle was running but did not

recall that Appellant's vehicle was running.
25.

(p.95, 97, 106-07)

Baugh further indicated that when the officers approached

Appellant's vehicle Appellant exited his vehicle, shut his door and
walked toward the officers.
26.

Appellant's

(p.104-106)

second and final witness, Tracy Dunbar,

testified that she drank the contents of a mini-bottle that was
found in Appellant's vehicle.

(p.Ill)

No more testimony or

evidence was offered.
27.

The juiry returned a verdict of guilty of driving under

the influence of alcohol and/or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a class B
misdemeanor and having an open container in a vehicle, a class B
misdemeanor —

both counts Appellant was charged with —

which

verdict Appellant is appealing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appeal where the appellant has seemingly collected
every possible argument to challenge a DUI conviction and bound the
same in his brief.

Several of his arguments have no application

to this case whatsoever.
Appellant's

Appellee has tried to sort out all of

arguments, group

them

appropriately

and

respond

completely to them.
The testimonial evidence admitted at trial by Appellee was
largely

uncontroverted.

What

little

was

Appellant's witnesses proved to be immaterial.

controverted

by

There was ample

competent evidence admitted at trial to support the jury verdict
8

under Appellee or Appellant's theory of the case.

This is an

appeal that could easily be resolved by reading the Statement of
Fact, supra, alone but the following argument is provided.
ARGUMENT
I
CITY OFFICERS ROPER AND PETERSON
APPELLANT TO A PRETEXT STOP.

DID

NOT

SUBJECT

Appellant's argument here is nonsense and without merit.

It

is completely uncontroverted that City Officers Roper and Peterson
did NOT stop Appellant —

Appellant was already stopped.

In fact

Appellant's theory of the case is that, according to Mr. Baugh's
testimony, when Appellant saw the officer approaching his

parked

vehicle he voluntary stepped out of and walked towards him.

Under

Appellee's theory Appellant did not step out of the already parked
vehicle until asked.
Even so the officers would have been justified in stopping
Appellant had it been necessary, or logically possible, because
they were

blocking

the

street with

their

parked

vehicles, a

violation of the state and city traffic codes.
II
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE
JURY THAT APPELLANT WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS
VEHICLE.
"It is unlawful and punishable . . . for any person to operate
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle . . .

if the person

is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle."
9

U.C.A. Sec. 41-

6-44(l)(a).
Appellant suggests that when the Officers Roper and Peterson
discovered him parked on the roadway in his vehicle early in the
morning of February 11, 1989 he was not in actual physical control
of his vehicLe.

Appellant correctly provides the standard for

finding actual physical control in his brief.
control can be established

"Actual physical

v

where the driver was seated in his

vehicle on the traveled portion of the highway; or where the motor
of the vehicLe was operating; or where the driver was attempting
to steer the automobile while it was in motion; or where he was
attempting to brake the vehicle to arrest its motion'" (Quoting
State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d

442, 443

(Utah 1971).

(Brief of

Appellant p.30).
More recently in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P. 2d 651 (1982)
the Utah Supreme Court indicated that "As a matter of public policy
and statutory construction, we believe that the vactual physical
control' language of Utah's implied consent statute should be read
as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their
vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants . . . ."

The

court went on to conclude that "where a motorist occupied the
driver's position behind the steering wheel with possession of the
ignition key and with the apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle, we hold that there has been an adequate showing of xactual
physical control' under our implied consent statute." Garcia, 645
P.2d at 653.
The Court further indicated in Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d
10

778, 781 (Utah 1986), that even if a vehicle is "presently immobile
because of mechanical trouble," which would include a collision or
having run out of gas, the driver can still be found to be in
actual physical control.
Turning to the immediate case the evidence presented at trial
clearly supports a finding that Appellant was in actual physical
control of his vehicle while parked in the roadway of a city
street.

Two officers testified they saw him, the single occupant

of his vehicle, sitting behind the wheel in the driver's position.
The officer who approached Appellant further testified that he
observed the keys to the truck in the ignition, could hear the
engine running and saw Appellant's
clutch pedal.

left foot depressed on the

When the officer asked Appellant to step out of the

vehicle he observed Appellant turn the ignition of his vehicle off.
Even Appellant's witness, Mr. Baugh, testified he
sitting

in

the

driver's

seat

saw

Appellant

of his vehicle parked on the side of

the road.
Based on these facts and Utah law provided as provided in the
Code and as annunciated by the Utah Supreme Court there can be no
question the jury was justified in finding Appellant in actual
physical control of his vehicle.
Ill
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
AGAINST BEING COMPELLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF
WHEN THE OFFICER REQUESTED HE PERFORM CERTAIN FIELD
SOBRIETY TESTS BEFORE READING HIM THE MIRANDA RIGHTS.
Appellant intimates that he was "compelled to give evidence
against himself" in violation of Article I Section 12 of the Utah
11

Constitution

cind also the

Constitution.

5th Amendment

to the United

States

His basis for this claim is founded in the fact that

Officer Roper asked him to perform certain field sobriety tests
without advising him of his Miranda rights.
The above-mentioned constitutional provisions constitute a bar
against compelling "communication" or "testimony" but the privilege
does not extend to barring compulsion which makes the accused the
source of "real" or "physical" evidence.

The leading case in this

area is Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed.
1021

(

) .

prohibition

In that case, Mr. Justice Holmes stated,

of compelling a man in criminal

"The

court to being a

witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral

compulsion

to

extort

communications

from

him,

not

an

exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
This

privilege

against

being

compelled

to

give

evidence

against oneself only extends to the extraction of guilt from a
persons own lips.

As a result, the use of the witness' body or

aspects of his body which do not communicate thoughts or ideas is
not prescribed.

Illustratively, Defendants may be compelled to

walk, stand, gesture, give hand writing examples, repeat phrases
for voice identification, submit to finger or footprinting, don
particular items of clothing, etc.

Schmerber v. California, 384

U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 908 (1966).
Additionally, Miranda rights need only be given to an accused
"if

the

setting

investigatory."

is

custodial

or

accusatory

rather

than

And "for purposes of determining whether a crime
12

has been committed, investigation and interview are critical and,
under such circumstances, the warning is not required."

Salt Lake

v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983).
Specifically to the subject matter of this dispute, the Utah
Supreme Court indicates

that where

field

sobriety tests are

requested and taken in a public street, with no indica of arrest
such as readied handcuffs, locked doors, or drawn guns and the
length of performance of the tests is only minutes, the setting is
non-custodial, even
accused.

though

investigation

had

focused

on the

Salt Lake v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983).

In the immediate case, these
administered

in the investigatory

field

sobriety tests were

stage before an arrest of

Appellant was made and before it was determined that the crime was
committed.

Appellant was not placed under arrest until after the

completion of the field sobriety tests when the officers came to
the conclusion that he was in fact intoxicated to the degree that
rendered him incapable of safely operating his vehicle. Appellant
was not compelled to testify against himself when Officer Roper
requested he perform several short field sobriety tests.
IV
THERE WAS ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS TO ARREST APPELLANT FOR
BOTH OFFENSES CHARGED.
"A peace officer may . . . without warrant, arrest a person
. . . (1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the
presence of any peace officer . . . ."
According

to

Officer

Roper's

testimony

U.C.A. Sec. 77-7-2.
three

offenses

were

committed in is presence. First, Appellant was parked in a roadway
13

in violation

of U.C.A.

Sec. 41-6-104, second, he had an open

container of alcohol in his vehicle in violation of U.C.A. Sec. 416-44.20 and third, Appellant was in actual physical control of a
vehicle while intoxicated in violation of U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44.
Appellant was arrested for the later two.
Apparently

Appellant

does

not

dispute

the

officer's

justification to arrest him for the open container violation.

He

provided no evidence to refute the same during the trial below and
provides no discussion concerning it in his brief. He does however
challenge the fact that the officer had reasonable cause to believe
Appellant was intoxicated.

Officer Roper's testimony indicates he

collected numerous data to support the fact that Appellant was
intoxicated including the results of several field sobriety tests.
Peterson

also

made

several

observations

before

coming

to

the

conclusion Appellant was intoxicated.
Appellant correctly states in his brief what indicators "are
enough

to lead a Reasonable and prudent person in the arresting

officers position to be justified in believing . . . '" Appellant
was intoxicated.
(Utah App. 1987).

(Quoting Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1037
According to Appellant these indicators include

"the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath; slurred speech; poor
balance; drooling; various

field

sobriety

tests."

(Citations

omitted.) (Appellant's Brief p.35.)
Appellant represents "the only objective fact that Officer
Roper relied on was an odor of alcohol."

(Appellant's Brief p.35)

However in stating this, Appellant clearly misrepresents Roper's
14

testimony

and wholly

overlooks

Peterson's

testimony.

Roper

testified (i) that he observed an odor of alcohol on Appellant's
breath, (ii) that he observed his face was extremely red and very
flushed and (iii) that Appellant failed the several field sobriety
tests administered by him.

Officer Peterson testified that (i)

Appellant had a strong odor of alcohol coming from him, (ii) his
face was extremely flushed, (iii) his eyes were very red, (iv) his
speech was deliberate, (v) he ran his words together, (vi) he
continually repeated words and (vii) he had trouble with his
balance.
The observations the officers testified they made before
effecting an arrest met the standard annunciated by Appellant in
his brief and went beyond. Clearly the officer's observed adequate
indicia of intoxication to arrest Appellant for being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated to a degree that
rendered Appellant incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
V
APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE,
Appellant goes to great lengths to argue the inaccuracy and
unreliability of the intoxilyzer machine in his brief. Appellant's
argument is confusing and misplaced.

Appellant refused to submit

to a test to determine the level of his intoxication; consequently,
no evidence generated by an intoxilyzer machine was available or
admitted.

15

VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEEDINGS BELOW ARE NOT VOID BECAUSE
THE ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY WHO PROSECUTED APPELLANT
ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO FILE AN OATH OF OFFICE OR EXECUTE A
BOND OF SUFFICIENT SURETIES.
Appellant suggests the trial proceedings, where he was tried
before a jury and convicted are completely void because he was
prosecuted by Assistant City Attorney, Jeffery "R" Burbank, who
had allegedly failed to file
public officials.

an oath of office required of all

Appellant does not dispute Burbank is licenced

to practice law in Utah, has taken an oath pursuant to membership
in the state bar and an oath pursuant to being appointed Assistant
Logan City Attorney. Appellant's claim is limited to the required
filing only.
Appellee maintains however, that Burbank, by the very nature
of his subordinate, part-time position in the City Attorney's
Office, is not required

to file such an oath.

But still,

Appellant's suggestion to void an entire trial proceeding from the
entry of the information against Appellant through the entry of
judgment and beyond is clearly not an appropriate corrective
measure. U.C.A. Section 10-3-829 provides "no official act of any
municipal officer shall be invalid for the reason that he failed
to take an oath of office."

Further, such defect of filing by

itself does not affect the Plaintiff's substantial rights.
In the appendix of Appellant's brief he lists other government
officials who have been acting as impostors because of the lack of
filing the required oath.

His enumeration includes, but is not

limited to, Governor Norman H. Bangerter, Justice Gordon R. Hall
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and all members of the Utah Senate and House of Representatives.
Appellant apparently hopes this Court of Appeals will void all
official acts taken by virtually every official in all three
branches

of

state

government

due

to

similar

deficiencies.

Appellant's argument, if successful would void the law he was tried
under, the officer who arrested him, the attorney who prosecuted
him, the judge who tried him and the court who will hear this
appeal.
The problem with Appellant's claim is two fold: first, his
claim is nothing more than mere assertions unaccompanied by proof
or affidavits (Burbank's oath of office is on file in the office
of the city recorder and was when he signed the amended information
charging Appellant and also on file when he prosecuted Appellant
for the crimes that are the subject of this appeal); second,
Appellant is, if you will, killing the goose that could potentially
lay his golden egg. For example, Appellant adamantly argues in his
Statement of Jurisdiction the Utah Court of Appeals is "unofficial,
unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void."

Yet he files this

appeal seeking this court to assume authority it is without to
declare it without authority to do the very thing he seeks.
Even if Appellant was correct with his assertion that the
prosecutor, the courts and others' actions have been conducted
without having properly filed an oath of office the remedy could
not be to dismantle all three branches of
government.

17

state and

local

VII
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW ASSISTANT
CITY ATTORNEY, JEFFERY "R" BURBANK, TO PROSECUTE
APPELLANT WHEN APPELLANT HAD FILED LAWSUITS AGAINST HIM.
Appellant argues this point without support in authority or
logic that it was error for the trial court to allow the Assistant
City Attorney, Jeffery "RM Burbank, to prosecute Appellant when
Appellant had lawsuits filed against the him.
This argument is absurd on its face.

Sheltering Appellant

from being prosecuted by an attorney merely because Appellant has
instigated civil action against the same could lead to a complete
miscarriage of justice.

Appellant could, through other well-

placed lawsuits, be able to insulate himself from prosecution for
any crime. Appellant would effectively award himself a license to
be lawless within any chosen jurisdiction,
VIII
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN THE TRIAL BELOW
TO ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME OF BEING IN
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR OTHER DRUG TO A DEGREE THAT
RENDERED APPELLANT INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING HIS
VEHICLE.
The standard for satisfying the requirement of corpus delicti
requires "only that the state present evidence that the injury
specified in the crime occurred, and that such injury was caused
by someone's criminal conduct."

State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175,

176 (Utah 1977) .
In the immediate case, Appellee met and went beyond this
minimal corpus delicti requirement.

Not only did Appellee put on

evidence to show the crime of being in actual physical control of
18

the vehicle was committed, it put on evidence to show that the
Appellant was the individual who committed the crime independent
of any admissions by Appellant.

In fact, two officers testified

they saw Appellant sitting behind the wheel of his vehicle on a
roadway and testified, based on their observations of Appellant,
he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him
incapable of safely driving his vehicle.
IX
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED ERRORS IN ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS.
The Utah Supreme Court indicated in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645
P. 2d 651, 653 (1982), that "the standard for appellate review of
factual findings affords great difference to the trial court's view
of the evidence unless a trial court has misapplied the law or its
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence."
In this appeal, Appellant must show where the trial court
"misapplied the law" or where its findings are "clearly against the
weight of the evidence."

Appellee maintains that the court's

findings are not inconsistent with the law or evidence but rather
completely consistent with competent evidence. A complete summary
of the important evidence admitted at trial is included above in
the statement of facts and argued herein with specificity.
In the immediate case, the jury chose to believe the officers'
testimony and found Appellant guilty of the offenses charged. The
law in Utah is clear:

"When there are divergent elements of

competent before the jury, its findings based on its belief as to
which preponderates will be respected on appeal..."
19

Weber Basin

Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730
(1958).
Appellant's most serious problem here is that he could have
reasonably

been

found

guilty regardless

of whether

the jury

believed the prosecution or defendant's version of the facts. All
material facts leading to a conviction remain uncontroverted.
Appellant's second witness, Tracy Dunbar, offered no evidence
relevant to the charged crimes and Appellant's first witness, Clyde
Baugh, largely substantiated the testimony of Appellee's witnesses
Officer Roper and Peterson.
X
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A
TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL.
Appellant claims in a general and vague manner that his right
to a fair trail was denied due to the alleged ineffectiveness of
his counsel. The burden Appellant must met for such a claim to be
effective is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).

In Strickland the Court stated "the benchmark for judging

any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."
The Court set forth two specific components that must be met
by Appellant to be successful in this claim:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the
20

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable."
id.

The Court further indicated that aside from cases where an

actual

conflict

of

"affirmatively prove
Appellant
deficient,

has

that

affirmatively

an

proved

interest
prejudice."
not

shown

actual

is

shown

defendant

must

performance

was

id.
his

counsel's

conflict

prejudice

the

of

resulted.

interest

existed

Appellant

or

provides

nothing in the argument portion of his brief to support his claim,
merely providing statements presented as "facts."
The only supporting evidence Appellant provides in his brief
relative to the issue of effectiveness of counsel is correspondence
concerning a complaint Appellant filed with the Utah State Bar
against his counsel, Gregory N. Skabelund included in his Appendix.
The letters Appellant includes in his brief injure his claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel because they suggest the contrary.

The

complaints filed by Appellant against Skabelund were dismissed.
Because Appellant fails to provide support for his claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel this argument of his must fail.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the conviction of Appellant should
stand.

DATED this 25th day of March, 1991.
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